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Abstract 
 
Placebo mechanisms are a neglected area of research. Kirsch‟s (1985) response 
expectancy theory described the stimulus-placebo response process as direct and 
unmediated. However, Hyland (2011) argued that the placebo effect is mediated by 
a parallel distributed processing (PDP) system, whereby all cognitive input is 
processed simultaneously, resulting in perseveration of the placebo effect. The 
present study examined this theory by utilising  a TENS device as a placebo 
„effecting‟ reaction times to a computer task, with an additional cognitive load task to 
further test the PDP system‟s existence. Although a general placebo effect was 
found that increased in the cognitive load conditions, no evidence of a perseveration 
effect was obtained. Possible reasons for this and implications for future work are 
discussed 
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Introduction 
With increased amounts of research being dedicated to uncovering the possible 
mechanisms through which placebos exert their influence, it is important to 
acknowledge the views put forward by theorists regarding the possible mediating 
processes between stimulus and placebo response. In essence, the placebo effect is 
the psychological or physiological response to an inert substance or procedure 
(Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). There has been much dispute as to the underlying 
mechanisms that cause it, but wide agreement that it transcends personality, gender, 
and culture, and is not limited to the type of treatment used (Geers et al., 2005). As 
research continues to show, the placebo effect is a genuine phenomenon that can affect 
everyone and has the potential to improve the body‟s physical symptoms without real 
medical intervention. 
There have been several attempts to explain the placebo effect in terms of its principal 
underlying mechanism, with aspects such as cognitive anticipation (Tolman, 1932) and 
emotional change (Brody & Brody, 2000) being highly regarded (Geers et al., 2005). 
The two main models of the placebo effect are expectancy theory and the classical 
conditioning approach. Expectancy theorists maintain that the placebo effect is a 
response to a placebo treatment which is driven by the anticipation of a particular 
outcome (Stewart-Williams, 2004). On the other hand, those who have adopted the 
classical conditioning approach argue that the placebo effect is a consciously or 
unconsciously learned response to a stimulus. It has been applied it to the classical 
conditioning paradigm first described by Pavlov (1927), whereby the repeated pairing of 
an active substance and a placebo over the course of a medical treatment will result in 
the placebo becoming capable of eliciting a response similar to that of the active 
substance (Ader, 1997).  These models are often pitted against each other because 
they outline different processes that mediate the placebo effect. However, as it will be 
shown, perhaps these two interpretations of the placebo effect are not mutually 
exclusive (Kirsch, 2004), and have paved the way towards a sophisticated neurological-
based explanation of the dynamic mediating process between stimulus and placebo 
response, examined through compliance to suggestions once they are known to be 
false (Hyland et al., 2011). 
As mentioned previously, the conditioning approach outlines that the placebo effect can 
be achieved when a substance or therapeutic procedure is associated, either 
consciously or unconsciously, with a specific effect, causing it to become an agent for 
this outcome (Bensing & Verheul, 2010). Voudouris et al. (1985) provides an empirical 
example of the conditioning mechanism: through a series of conditioning trials, they 
were able to produce a placebo response to a placebo analgesic cream by manipulating 
the pain stimulation levels that the participants received. The results confirmed that the 
placebo response could be conditioned through non-conscious awareness; participants 
who were subjected to surreptitiously lowered pain intensity reported feeling less pain, 
contrasting to those who reported feeling more pain when an increase in the pain 
stimulation was paired with administration of the placebo. In a subsequent study, 
Voudouris et al. (1990) attempted to replicate these earlier findings, but also examined 
the role of verbal expectancy in the placebo effect. Results suggested that conditioning 
was a more powerful means of creating a placebo response than verbal expectancy 
because the placebo effect occurred within the conditioning manipulation and opposed 
the expectancy (Pollo et al., 2001). Voudouris et al. (1990) took this to demonstrate the 
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superiority of the conditioning mechanism over the expectancy model of the placebo 
effect. 
Although this provides support for the view that placebo responses are perhaps 
unconsciously learned through classical conditioning procedures, others have disputed 
this finding. Expectancy theorists depict placebo effects as a product of the recipient‟s 
anticipation of a specific outcome; a placebo produces an effect purely because the 
recipient expects it to. Overall, the support for expectancy theory is substantial and 
consistent, with many robust effects found concerning its mediating effect. Montgomery 
and Kirsch (1997) replicated the conditioning procedure that Voudouris et al. (1990) had 
implemented, but in order to test the relationship of expectancy and conditioning in the 
mediated placebo response, the informed group were aware that the intensity of the 
stimulus was going to be lowered during the trials. It was found that conscious 
awareness eliminated the conditioning effects of pairing pain reduction with the 
analgesic, thereby indicating that the effects of conditioning were entirely mediated by 
expectancy (Kirsch, 2004).  
Furthermore, there is a considerable amount of other research that has demonstrated 
the consciously mediating role of expectancies through the application of neurocognitive 
techniques to placebo analgesia; Zubieta et al. (2005) used fMRI imaging techniques to 
show that the expectation of pain relief via a placebo with expected analgesic properties 
was capable of moderating physical and emotional states. This was shown to occur 
through its mediation by the pain-suppressive endogenous opioid system, thus 
supporting the view that expectancy can directly produce placebo effects.  
Despite these two widely accepted theories, others have put forward alternate 
explanations of the prospective variables involved in the mediation of the placebo effect. 
Tolman (1932) proposed a cognitive-based explanation of the conditioned-expectancy 
mechanism; he did not accept that the conditioning process simply established an 
unconscious link between the stimulus and the response, such as that proposed by 
Voudouris et al. (1985). Instead, he argued that an organism acquires a cognition 
allowing it to predict the sequence of events by learning that the conditioned stimulus 
(active substance or procedure) is a reliable signal for the occurrence of the 
unconditioned stimulus (placebo), and thus form a preparatory response. This 
interpretation implies that the organism being conditioned is cognitively active in the 
process as it anticipates an outcome, suggesting that expectancies can be shaped by 
conditioning procedures (Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004). 
A second alternative explanation is emotional change theory which states that placebo 
effects are the product of a change in emotional state; taking a placebo leads to the 
elimination of undesired symptoms and thus enhances health through anxiety reduction 
(Brody & Brody, 2000).  Although it has been accepted that psychological placebo 
effects, such as increased hope, are a likely result of some emotional changes in 
patients (Barlow & Durand, 2009), this theory cannot account for the precise underlying 
mechanism involved in eliciting a placebo effect. Consequently, it was incorporated into 
an expectancy-based account whereby, according to Stewart-Williams (2004), 
emotional change is the possible mediating variable between expectancies and 
response. 
Therefore, conditioning and expectancy are perhaps not mutually exclusive processes; 
conditioning procedures produce an association between the stimulus and a  
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2012, 5, (2), 203-223 
 
[206] 
 
representation of the outcome - an expectancy. Conceivably, this suggests that 
conditioning is not so much an automatic process which evades cognition, but is 
actually a component of expectancy (Kirsch, 2004).  
 
The majority of expectancy theorists accept that conditioning procedures are capable of 
producing placebo responses, which they maintain are placebo response expectancies; 
therefore it is the expectancy that elicits the response. Kirsch (1997) put forward his 
theory of response expectancies, which he described as “automatic consequences of 
one‟s own belief” (Kirsch & Lynn, 1999), including anticipations of one‟s own automatic, 
subjective, and behavioural responses to situational cues, which are directly self-
confirming (e.g. expecting to feel more alert after drinking coffee). 
Kirsch (1985) posited that there are no intervening psychological variables between a 
response expectancy and the generation of a placebo response. This notion was 
developed in his immediacy hypothesis, which described it as an unmediated causal 
relationship between response expectancy and expected response because effects are 
experienced as automatic. Kirsch and Weixel (1988) demonstrated this through the 
physiological changes that were observed in individuals‟ experiences directly after the 
administration of a placebo; physiological effects were measured after the participants 
had consumed placebo (decaffeinated) coffee. It was found that deceptive 
administration of the placebo coffee produced physiological effects that mimicked the 
consumption of real coffee, such as an increase in pulse rate and increased alertness. 
However, some of the participants who were aware that they might receive placebo 
coffee showed opposite physiological effects to those in the deceptive administration 
condition, suggesting that it is the individual‟s belief about the effects of a substance or 
procedure that is imperative to producing a response to a suggestion (Kirsch & Weixel, 
1988).  
Specifically, Kirsch (1997) proposed in his immediacy hypothesis that there is a unique 
causal pathway between each response expectancy and response. His reasoning for 
this stemmed from his belief that some connections among variables had to be 
unmediated; otherwise there would be an infinite number of intervening variables. Using 
the example of subjective states, Kirsch (1985) stated that expectations for a subjective 
state can lead directly to that state and are therefore unmediated. For example, one 
might feel anxiety from the expectation of anxiety. Kirsch (1985) also applied this to 
objective states, which he viewed as autonomic responses that are directly connected 
with subjective states (Stewart-Williams, 2004). For example, one may experience 
increased heart rate when aroused. An investigation by Koyoma et al. (2005) into the 
neural mechanisms underlying expectations of pain revealed that the anticipation of an 
impending stimulus can shape neural processes that occur in the brain; when 
participants anticipated that a stimulus was going to be painful, there was an immediate 
increase in the activation of the thalamus and prefrontal cortex, which overlapped with 
activity in brain regions associated with expectation. This supports Kirsch‟s belief that 
response expectancy effects are an automatic and direct process, without any influence 
from mediating variables. 
Despite this research, which has been highly influential with regard to the possible 
mechanisms that elicit the placebo effect, Hyland (2011) put forward a different account 
of expectancy and response that opposes Kirsch‟s (1985) view that placebo effects are 
the result of an immediate and unmediated process. This account argues that there is in 
fact a mediating process between the generation of an expectancy and a response; an 
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automatic system intervenes when an expectancy is generated, and a subsequent 
response is produced, although the effects are not immediate. Hyland (2011) proposed 
that this intervening system within the brain is a parallel processing system that consists 
of interconnected units that relay information by activating or inhibiting connections. 
Hyland‟s theory is based upon a parallel distributed processing (PDP) model of the 
brain and body as a complimentary entity that attempts to explain information 
processing in terms of a network of neurons in the brain (Hyland, 1985). As specified by 
McClelland and Rumelhart (1986), the PDP model has three assumptions: that the 
representation of information is distributed and not local; that memory and knowledge 
for specific things are stored in connections between processing units; and that learning 
can occur gradually through experience due to changes in connection strength. Hyland 
(2011) acknowledged that a strengthening in connections between the units (neurons) 
within the network is how information can be distributed throughout it, a process that 
occurs in parallel, rather than sequential, operations. 
In terms of the placebo effect, Hyland (2011) suggested that it is produced when an 
expectation to a suggestion is made and consciously mediated by the parallel 
distributed processing system. The underlying assumption is that the mind is massively 
parallel; it simultaneously processes large amounts of information, which subsequently 
produces hysteresis (a lagging in the time between cognitive input and response output) 
(Hyland, 2011). This perspective has been supported by the neuromatrix theory of pain 
proposed by Melzack (2001), which views the body as a unified cross-modal system 
that encompasses pain into an array of interconnected neurons. Although this theory is 
based on the mechanisms that underlie pain rather than placebos, it proffers a view of 
the body that is similar to the model proposed by Hyland; the neuromatrix permits the 
parallel processing of sensory inputs that are then distributed throughout many areas of 
the brain and body, comparable to the parallel processing of information by the brain 
and body as a unified entity, described by Hyland‟s (2011) PDP theory.  
Hyland (2011) argues that hysteresis demonstrates that a PDP system exists in the 
brain because the simultaneous processing of information will lead to the perseveration 
of the placebo response (Hyland et al., 2011). This is due to time differences between 
the onset of cognitive input, the processing of this information, and the response, 
implying that response to a placebo stimulus will not be immediate (Hyland et al., 2011), 
contrary to Kirsch‟s (1985) perspective. This notion of cognitive perseveration has also 
been endorsed by Brosschot et al. (2010), who postulated that the slow recovery of an 
individual after experiencing psychological stressors must be due to more than just 
biological mechanisms alone; they suggested that a process of „perseverative cognition‟ 
causes the effects of stressors to persevere, and speculated that this is perhaps due to 
the creation of mental representations of stressors which proceed long after the event 
has occurred. This is comparable to Hyland‟s theory because expectancies are viewed 
as internal representations processed alongside other information by the individual, 
which subsequently results in the perseveration of a response.  
Hyland et al. (2011) tested his hypothesis using a reaction time task, whereby 
participants were led to believe that a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation 
(TENS) device would have an effect upon their reaction time; some were informed that 
the electric current emitted from the TENS device would make them respond faster, and 
the remainder were informed that it would make them respond slower. Participants 
completed three blocks of 100 reaction time trials, but before the third block, half of the 
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participants were informed that the TENS device was in fact a placebo and would have 
no effect on their reaction time; any difference in their reaction times would be due to 
their belief that it had had an effect. Hyland et al. (2011) found that participants‟ 
response times did change after they received information notifying them that it was a 
sham; however, compliance with the suggestion was maintained for approximately 42 
seconds after being informed that it was false. These results led to Hyland et al. (2011) 
postulating that an automatic system had come into effect, as the sudden change in 
cognitive input (information that the suggestion was false) had resulted in its processing 
alongside the reaction time task. This caused prolonged compliance with the suggestion 
(demonstrated by the sustained placebo response) because although the participants 
were consciously aware that it was a placebo and was therefore having no real effect, 
there was a delay in this cognitive processing to affect their physiological response, 
demonstrating hysteresis.  
The aim of the current study was to investigate Hyland‟s theory that a PDP system 
exists in the brain; specifically, that there will be automatic compliance with the 
suggestion once that suggestion is known to be false, demonstrated through the 
perseveration of the placebo effect. This was determined by replicating Hyland et al.‟s 
(2011) study; a reaction time task was used to measure the perseveration of the 
placebo effect once it was known that the TENS device had no genuine effect. A TENS 
device emits a small electrical current used for therapeutic purposes, but in this study it 
was used as a placebo. The device was chosen as an ethically suitable placebo 
because it has no known health or safety effects, and is simple to use and control. In 
addition, it was decided that the device would not be a familiar piece of equipment to the 
sample of participants tested, thus creating a false suggestion more likely to be 
accepted by the participants as true in order to mislead them about the TENS device‟s 
proposed qualities (i.e. that it will effect reaction time). The current study was therefore 
a replication of the study by Hyland et al. (2011) in terms of design and material.  
However, this study aimed to further examine the existence of a PDP system, using the 
perseveration of response to a suggestion as a measure of compliance. This was 
achieved by including a cognitive load task condition alongside the reaction time task. 
The addition of the cognitive load task into the study was necessary to further 
investigate the notion of an automatic system with regards to the processing of 
information; if participants were informed that the TENS device was a placebo and had 
to complete a cognitive load task, this would bear a heavy cognitive burden upon the 
PDP system, resulting in the simultaneous processing of a large amount of information. 
Any perseveration would therefore imply that a PDP system exists within the brain.  
The cognitive load task that was chosen for the study was based on the task used by 
Rees et al. (2001); an auditory task whereby participants were required to name aloud 
the words that have two syllables in a list of words played to them. This was chosen as 
the most suitable cognitive load task because participants in the current study had to 
complete an onscreen reaction time task, and so an auditory task seemed most 
appropriate. In addition, the task was deemed as being of medium-level difficulty; 
participants were required to ignore one and three syllable words, and only say aloud 
the two syllable words they heard in a list of 60 words.  
As well as this, the current study deviated from the original by using a within-subject 
control that was omitted by Hyland et al. (2011). Each participant had only one arm 
attached to the TENS device as a control measure; it was randomised as to whether the 
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left or right arm would be the „placebo treated‟ arm in an attempt to eliminate the 
confounding effect of the left or right dominant hand during the reaction time task.  
The current study therefore hypothesised that there would be an effect of instruction on 
response times which would be in the direction of the suggestion (either fast or slow). In 
addition, it was predicted that response times would be slower in participants who 
undertook the cognitive load task. Secondly, the study hypothesised that the TENS 
device would induce a placebo effect specifically in the „placebo-treated‟ arm, owing to 
the suggestion given to each participant in the instructions. Thirdly, the study aimed to 
investigate whether participants in the informed condition would exhibit perseveration of 
the placebo response (hysteresis). Finally, it was hypothesised that this perseveration 
would be enhanced in the participants undertaking the cognitive load task, because the 
parallel processing of the information would result in temporary automatic compliance 
with the suggestion once it was known to be false, as previously found by Hyland et al. 
(2011). 
Methodology 
Participants 
For their participation, 81 students (33 males and 48 females) from the stage one and 
stage two psychology programme at Plymouth University were given „participation 
points‟ as part of a course requirement for a compulsory module in research methods. 
The mean age of the participants was 19-years-old. Sixty-five were right-handed and 
the remaining 16 were left-handed. No other demographic information was recorded. 
Experimenters 
Participants were tested by three 22-year-old females studying psychology at Plymouth 
University. The experimenters wore smart black clothes during the experiments in order 
to promote a sense of professionalism, and took it in turns to test participants. The 
experimenters were given identical instructions on how to use the TENS device 
correctly. 
Materials 
Numbered envelopes containing „scientific‟ rationale (a diagram of a neuron and false 
information regarding the electrical current produced by the TENS device) were used to 
create the suggestion that the TENS device would have an effect on response times 
(see Appendix 1). One was given to each participant and suggested that the aim of the 
study was to test whether the electrical current of a TENS device would affect their 
reaction times to an onscreen computer task. Forty-two participants were informed that 
the TENS device was going to make one of their arms respond faster, and 39 
participants were told that it was going to have a negative effect on their reaction time, 
making them respond slower. Aside from this, the information on the sheets was 
identical. Five scientific books and the large box that the TENS device was carried in 
were put in sight of the participants in order to contribute to the expectation, and further 
their clinical experience. 
A computer programme, PsychoPy, was used to carry out the reaction time task. A 
bespoke design for this study was created to include specific onscreen messages and 
instructions (see Figure 2). A standard set of onscreen instructions was shown to all 
participants regarding the reaction time task, and instructions on the cognitive load task 
were verbally given only to the participants that were required to do it (see Appendix 4). 
The reaction time task involved the participant responding with either a left (A key) or 
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right (L key) key press in accordance with the side of the screen a target („X‟) appeared. 
Once the participant responded, their reaction time (measured in milliseconds) and 
whether they were correct or incorrect (indicated by „correct!‟ or „oops!‟) showed on the 
screen for approximately 500ms. Between each reaction time frame and target frame, 
the participant had to fixate on a central point („+‟) on the screen before the next target 
appeared in order to keep their vision focused (see figure 1 below). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cognitive load task was used in four of the conditions and consisted of four audio 
recordings: one practice trial, which consisted of 14 words and was 42 seconds long, 
and three lists of 60 words which were approximately two minutes and 22 seconds in 
length (refer to the attached CD). The recordings were produced by the experimenters 
using a dictaphone and a list of one, two, and three syllable words (see Appendix 7). 
These recordings were administered to each participant in a randomised order to 
eliminate practice effects by using Excel to randomise the order that the three lists 
would be played. The audio recordings were contained on an MP3 player and were not 
built into the computer programme. This was to ensure that the experimenter had 
control over the timing of when each recording was played, rather than having to exit 
PsychoPy to play it. 
Design 
A 2 (instructions) x 2 (message) x 2 (cognitive load) between-subjects design was used; 
each participant was randomly assigned to one of four conditions: informed/fast, 
informed/slow, placebo/fast, and placebo/slow. This was further divided into two more 
conditions, whereby half of the participants undertook the cognitive load task and the 
other half did not (see table 1 below). In addition, a within-subjects control was 
implemented; each participant produced both a placebo affected score and a placebo 
unaffected score, which was achieved by having only one of their arms connected to the 
Figure 1: An example of each frame in the onscreen reaction time task experiment. 
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TENS device. It was randomised as to which arm (either right or left) each participant 
was going to have connected up to the TENS device in order to eliminate the effect of 
„handedness‟ on their reaction time scores. This was achieved by assigning each 
participant number to either left or right using Excel to randomise these factors. The 
alpha level was set at p<.05.  
Throughout the experiments, the experimenters remained blind as to which condition 
(either fast or slow) each participant was assigned to; this information was contained in 
envelopes given to each participant. An external person was responsible for the 
numbering and recording of the conditions each envelope contained. Only one 
participant was tested at a time to minimise distractions. 
Table 1: The eight conditions used in the experiment and how many participants in each 
condition (n). 
 Instructed Fast Instructed Slow 
Informed Load (n=10) Load (n=10) 
No Load (n=11) No Load (n=10) 
Not Informed Load (n=10) Load (n=9) 
No Load (n=11) No Load (n=10) 
 
Table one illustrates the eight conditions that the participants were randomly assigned 
to and how many were in each of the conditions. 
 
Procedure 
Upon entering the testing room, the participant was situated in front of a computer 
screen and provided with a brief outlining the experimental procedure (see Appendix 
2), and a consent form informing them of their right to withdraw from the experiment 
at any time (see Appendix 3 and refer to the attached envelope). They were also 
informed of these rights verbally by the experimenter. After consenting, they were 
given a numbered envelope which contained written instructions about the purported 
aim of the experiment and „scientific‟ rationale to make the suggestion more 
convincing; 42 of the participants were informed that the electric current would make 
their treated arm respond faster during the reaction time task, and 39 were informed 
that it would make their treated arm respond slower. Aside from this, all of the 
instructions were identical.  
Verbal instructions were given to the participant by the experimenter regarding the 
TENS device, and the experimenter then attached the two electrodes from the 
device to either the participant‟s right or left forearm. Whereas normally a TENS 
device is used to stimulate nerves for therapeutic purposes, in this study it was 
purely used as a placebo. Once attached to the participant‟s forearm with sticky 
pads, the device was switched on by the experimenter, and the current adjusted to 
be sub-threshold (at setting number 5 to give a small and consistent pulsing 
sensation), and turned back off again.  
The participant then received further verbal instructions about the requirements of 
the task and, once they understood these, they were asked to turn their attention to 
the computer screen and respond with either a left (A key) or right key press (L key). 
Before the task began, the experimenter was prompted by the computer programme 
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to enter the number corresponding to the number on the envelope the participant 
was given into the box on the screen to ensure that the participant‟s data would be 
recorded against the correct condition that they were assigned to. Once this was 
complete, the participant was asked to put the headphones on.  
The participant was then ready for the practice trial. The 39 participants who were 
assigned to the cognitive load condition received verbal instructions from the 
experimenter about the task. Once they understood, the experimenter pressed the 
audio recording to coincide with each trial of the reaction time task. During the 
practice trial, the participant was presented with 10 practice trials of the reaction time 
task and the practice cognitive load task recording (if they were assigned to this 
condition).  After the practice trial, the participant was presented with three blocks of 
50 reaction time trials: 
In block 1 of the trials, the TENS machine remained off for all participants. All of the 
participants received onscreen instructions informing them of how to respond during 
the reaction time task, and verbal instructions if they were participating in the 
cognitive load task. In block 2, the TENS device was switched on by the 
experimenter when prompted by an onscreen message. The experimenter informed 
the participant that the TENS device was now on, and to continue when they were 
ready. 
After finishing block 2 and immediately before block 3, participants were informed by 
an onscreen message that they were about to be shown an „important message‟ in 
the next frame that they needed to read carefully and continue with the experiment 
once they had understood it. They were told to ask the experimenter any questions 
they had then and not to ask the experimenter any more once the message had 
been shown. Twenty of the participants who were in the slow condition and 21 of the 
participants who were in the fast condition were informed via onscreen instruction 
that they had been misled about the nature of the TENS device, and that it could 
have had no possible effect on their reaction times. The other 40 participants who 
were in the uninformed condition remained deceived throughout the experiment, and 
received a neutral instruction of equivalent visual length (see Appendix 5). They then 
completed the final block of trials. A visual representation of the experiment can be 
seen below in Figure 2.  
Upon completion of all three trials, the participant received a full debrief, including 
details of the real aim of the study and the experimenters‟ and supervisor‟s contact 
details (see Appendix 6). They were thanked for their time, and were asked whether 
they had any questions. They were informed to contact the experimenters or their 
supervisor if they had any further questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Plymouth Student Scientist, 2012, 5, (2), 203-223 
 
[213] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A visual representation of the timings of the experiment 
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics for the eight experimental groups are given in Table 1. Raw 
data is available in Appendix 8 and the attached CD. The hypotheses are answered 
below.  
Does the load condition slow responses? 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to establish whether the cognitive 
load task slowed participants‟ response times. The results indicated that the effect of 
cognitive load on reaction time was as predicted, t(59.63) = -4.09, p > .001. 
Specifically, those in the cognitive load condition (n=39) had significantly slower 
reaction times compared to those in the no load condition (n=42). 
Does the TENS device induce a placebo effect specifically in treated arms? 
An analysis of covariance (repeated measures factor: treated/untreated arm; 
covariate: block 1) was conducted to determine whether the TENS device 
specifically induced a placebo effect in the treated arm of the participants. Normality 
and homogeneity of variance could not be assumed, and so the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was used. Results from the analysis of covariance revealed that 
there was no significant difference between response times for treated and untreated 
arms, F(1, 76) = .88, p = .35. It also showed that there was no significant interaction 
between treated/untreated arm and load (cognitive load/no load), F(1, 76) = 1, p = 
.32, or between treated/untreated arm and instruction (fast/slow), F(1, 76) = .14, 
p=.71. This is evidenced further by the interaction plot in figure 5 below. 
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Table 1: Number of participants, mean, and standard deviation of reaction times for the 
three variables (instruction, message, and load) and the three blocks of trials. 
Block Variable N M SD 
 Instruction    
1 Slow 39 354.76 77.24 
 Fast 42 352.64 76.2 
2 Slow 39 363.83 93.78 
 Fast 42 345.48 74.08 
3 Slow 39 359.27 86.45 
 Fast 42 349.08 82.05 
 Message    
1 Not Informed 40 348.09 75.14 
 Informed 41 359.12 77.82 
2 Not Informed 40 350.28 82.06 
 Informed 41 358.05 86.69 
3 Not Informed 40 352.29 89 
 Informed 41 355.52 79.47 
 Load    
1 No Cognitive 
Load 
42 335.9 63.96 
 Cognitive Load 39 373.24 84.43 
2 No Cognitive 
Load 
42 333.21 60.88 
 Cognitive Load 39 377.4 99.57 
3 No Cognitive 
Load 
42 336.9 71.93 
 Cognitive Load 39 372.71 92.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Plot of the interaction between treated („factor1‟ 1)/untreated hand („factor1‟ 2) and 
instruction (slow/fast) 
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     Figure 5 shows that the placebo effect created by the TENS device was not arm-
specific; there was no interaction between reaction times for treated („factor1‟ 
1)/untreated arms („factor1‟ 2) and fast or slow instruction, indicated by the lack of 
crossover on the plot.  
 
    Is there a general effect of placebo instructions on response times? 
    An analysis of covariance (between-subjects factors: instruction and load; covariate: 
block 1) was conducted to determine whether the instructions (fast and slow) 
effected the participants‟ response times in the reaction time task. Normality and 
homogeneity of variance could not be assumed, and so the Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction was used. The results from the analysis of covariance indicated that there 
was a significant difference in response times between the fast and slow instruction 
conditions in the cognitive load condition only, F(1, 76) = .2, p<.05. 
 
     In addition, the mean response times for the fast and slow conditions and the 
cognitive load and no load conditions showed evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-
off, and this was inversely correlated; the error rates were higher for participants who 
had faster reaction times and lower for participants who had responded slower.  
     
    Does cognitive load increase or decrease the placebo effect? 
    The analysis of covariance (between-subjects factor: instruction; covariate: block 1) 
indicated that the difference between the reaction times in the fast and slow 
instruction conditions increased in the cognitive load condition only, F(1, 76) = 12.12, 
p <.001. This implies that cognitive load increased the placebo effect.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Plot showing the interaction between instruction (fast/slow) and the load (cognitive 
load/no load) condition 
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  Figure 6 indicates that there is an interaction between the load (cognitive load/no 
cognitive load) and instruction (fast/slow) conditions (p<.001). Furthermore, it can be 
seen that instructions only had an effect in the cognitive load condition, which again 
signifies that cognitive load increased the placebo effect, thus supporting the 
hypothesis. 
 
Is there evidence of a perseveration effect? 
The independent-samples t-test for the message (informed/not informed) conditions 
revealed that, with the exception of segment two (trial 11-20), t(77.33) = 1.99, p = 
.05, there was no significant perseveration of the placebo effect in any of the other 
four segments during block three. For example, segment one (trial 1-10), t(78) = 
1.65, p = .1. The results from the independent-samples t-test for the instruction 
(fast/slow) conditions showed that there was no significant placebo perseveration 
effect in any of the five segments during block three. For example, segment 1 (trial 1-
10), t(66.63) = 1.6, p = .12.  The independent-samples t-test for the load (cognitive 
load/no cognitive load) conditions indicated that there was a marginally significant 
perseverative effect in segments one, two, and three within block three: segment one 
(trial 1-10), t(62.01) = 2.51, p = .02; segment 2 (trial 11-20), t(49.83) = 2.01, p = .05; 
segment 3 (trial 21-30), t(62.8) = 2.97, p = .004.  
Does load increase the perseveration of the placebo effect? 
       Given that evidence of a substantial and significant placebo perseveration effect was 
not obtained, it was not possible to test whether or not the cognitive load increased 
the perseveration of the placebo effect. 
 
Discussion 
In terms of the previous research conducted on the existence of a mediating PDP 
system, the findings of the present study differed in the level of support they provided, 
with results that were both complementary and contradictory to the hypotheses, and the 
theory as a whole. A placebo effect was obtained from the suggestions set out in the 
instructions; however, this was constricted to the cognitive load condition. The 
perseveration of the placebo effect in block three failed to achieve statistical significance.  
The first hypotheses („does the load condition slow responses?‟) was proved, as the t-
score from the independent-samples t-test was significant, indicating that the cognitive 
load condition had a negative effect on response times compared to those of participants 
who did not undergo the cognitive load task. This detrimental effect of the additional 
cognitive input attained from having a higher cognitive burden was as predicted, and 
perhaps provides support for the existence of a PDP system; because the participants in 
the cognitive load condition had a higher amount of cognitive input than those who were 
not required to do the task, the parallel processing of this additional information perhaps 
produced slower physiological responses. This interpretation therefore conforms to 
Hyland‟s (2011) theory that concurrent processing of cognitive input within the brain 
causes a slower physiological output (response) by the body. 
No significant difference between response times for treated and untreated arms was 
found by the repeated measures analysis of covariance, disproving the second 
hypothesis („does the TENS device induce a placebo effect specifically in treated 
arms?‟). This implies that the suggestions regarding the purported effect of the TENS 
device upon reaction times set out in the instructions were generalised to both arms in 
the two instruction conditions (fast and slow). A possible explanation for this in terms of 
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Hyland‟s (2011) PDP system theory could be that the expectation of the effect of the 
TENS device was processed alongside the other cognitive input, such as the reaction 
time task, and the cognitive load task for the participants in this condition. This parallel 
processing could then have resulted in the placebo effect becoming generalised to both 
arms because of the cross-modal mind and body system; the arm that was „untreated‟ by 
the placebo still responded to the suggestion in the same direction that the „treated‟ arm 
did, and was therefore equally effected by the placebo instructions and TENS device. 
Therefore, this finding can be interpreted in terms of Hyland‟s (2011) view of the mind 
and body as a unified entity, and so perhaps provides support for the existence of a PDP 
system.  
The results of the repeated measures analysis of covariance also showed that there was 
no significant interaction between treated/untreated arm and the load (cognitive load/no 
load) conditions, or between treated/untreated arm and the instruction (fast/slow) 
conditions. The most likely reason for this is because of the transcendence of the 
placebo effect to both arms, and so it could not interact as two separate variables 
(treated and untreated) with the load and instruction conditions.  
The hypothesis that a general effect of placebo instructions would be induced in the 
participants in terms of their response times was proved („is there a general effect of 
placebo instructions on response times?‟), as the results of the between-subjects 
analysis of covariance showed. Specifically, a significant difference in reaction times 
between the participants in the fast instruction condition and the slow instruction 
condition was obtained, but revealed that instructions only had an effect in the cognitive 
load condition. This indicates that the suggestions set out in the instructions, coupled with 
the utilisation of the TENS device on the participants‟ arms, caused those in the cognitive 
load condition to respond in the desired direction.  
Firstly, this finding of a general placebo effect provides support for expectancy theory, as 
well as contributing to this area of research, as it has demonstrated that a specific written 
expectation, reinforced with the use of a physical placebo, is able to produce specific 
effects depending on the placebo instructions presented. However, the significant 
difference between instructions was only found when the cognitive load condition was 
added, which contradicts previous placebo research. This finding was therefore 
unexpected considering that Hyland et al. (2011) found a general placebo effect of 
instructions and did not incorporate a cognitive load task into their study.  
A possible explanation for this outcome in terms of a PDP system is that the participants 
with higher cognitive input (the suggestion and the cognitive load task) had more to 
process, and so compliance to the suggestion occurred in conjunction with the cognitive 
load task because deeper and continuous processing was required to compensate for 
the extra cognitive burden, thus resulting in a placebo effect. In keeping with a cognitive 
explanation, an alternative reason for this finding could be that the requirement of the 
cognitive load task furthered the focus of the participants to the task at hand; their 
cognitive load was higher than those not in the load condition and so they were less 
responsive to potential distractions in the environment (e.g. noise, the presence of the 
experimenters etc.), and thus their concentration was kept on the instructions as well as 
the cognitive load task. However, these possible accounts for the present findings do not 
explain the previous findings, and so in order to justify the reasoning for this contradictory 
result, further testing of the interaction between cognitive load and instructions would be 
needed. This could be conducted through the inclusion of more conditions for different 
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levels of cognitive load. For example, rather than just two load conditions, as in the 
present study (cognitive load task or no cognitive load task), perhaps differing levels of 
cognitive load could be incorporated, such as low-medium-high, in order to uncover 
whether a higher cognitive load could produce an effect of instructions upon response 
times. 
In addition, it was found that there was an inversely correlated speed-accuracy trade-off 
in the instruction and load conditions, meaning that error rates were higher in those 
participants who were responding faster with a higher cognitive load, and lower for 
participants with slower reaction times and less cognitive burden. Conceivably, this could 
be due to the „difficulty‟ of each trial, determined by the distance from the fixation point 
(the centre of the screen) that the stimulus was displayed, and suggests that when the 
trial was difficult within the fast instruction and cognitive load condition, participants had 
higher error rates (were less accurate) than those who were in the slow instruction and 
no cognitive load condition. Again, this perhaps provides support for the PDP view of the 
brain because the high cognitive load combined with faster reactions is likely to result in a 
greater number of errors when responding to the reaction time task because the 
physiological response is compromised owing to the high cognitive input. 
The results from the independent-samples t-test revealed that, overall, no significant 
perseveration of the placebo effect was found from comparing the block three response 
times of participants across all of the conditions, disproving the hypothesis („is there 
evidence of a perseveration effect?‟). However, a marginally significant perseveration 
effect was found within the message conditions (informed/not informed) in segment two 
(trials 11-20), suggesting that compliance to the suggestion once it was known to be false 
occurred 15-30 seconds into the final block of trials, and then this effect dissipated. This 
finding contrasts with the previous research, which found evidence of a robust 
perseveration effect from the beginning of block three for approximately 42 seconds in 
participants who were informed that the TENS device would not have in fact made a 
difference to their reaction times (Hyland et al., 2011). Despite the small significance in 
segment two for the two message conditions (informed/not informed), it is not sufficient 
enough to be able to state with confidence that a placebo perseveration effect was 
obtained. Therefore, the final hypothesis („does load increase the perseveration of the 
placebo effect?‟) could also not be tested. Given that a lack of interaction was found 
between the load and instruction conditions, this outcome was expected; although it was 
hypothesised that those in the cognitive load condition would show a stronger 
perseveration effect than those in the no cognitive load condition, the findings above 
indicated that this could not be possible because instruction only had an effect in the 
cognitive load condition. Therefore, those participants who did not show an effect of 
instruction would not be able to show a placebo perseveration effect.  It was therefore not 
possible to test whether the cognitive load task increased the placebo perseveration 
effect in participants. Owing to this lack of convincing evidence of the existence of a PDP 
system, Hyland‟s (2011) theory could not be accepted in this study.  
There are several limitations with the study that could perhaps explain why some of the 
hypotheses could not be accepted. Firstly, the sample was taken from undergraduate 
psychology students within the university who participated in exchange for compulsory 
module points. This limited sample makes results difficult to generalise to other 
individuals, as it is possible that psychology students may respond differently in 
experiments than others because of their subject knowledge; owing to their participation 
in other studies, they may have tried to guess the true purpose of the experiment and 
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either conformed or rebelled against what they believed the aim was, which may have 
altered their responses. In order to obtain more valid and generalisable findings, a wider 
and more representative sample of participants would be required, perhaps by 
encouraging students from other courses to participate and advertising outside of the 
university to the general public in order to achieve more generalisable results. 
The methodology that the study utilised can also be heavily critiqued. To begin with, the 
presence of the experimenters in the room may have affected how the participants 
responded in the experiment, particularly because the experimenter testing the 
participant had to sit in close proximity in order to control the TENS device. This may 
have been off-putting to the participant, and could have caused them to respond 
differently in the reaction time and cognitive load task (if they were in this condition) than 
if the experimenter had been absent, compromising the validity of the data. However, this 
would be difficult to implement in a future study because the experimenter‟s presence is 
necessary to turn on the TENS device at the beginning of block two and monitor the 
settings for the participant‟s experience. Alternatively, the experimenter‟s presence may 
have contributed to the placebo effect by causing the participant to further comply with 
the suggestion that the TENS device was going to affect their reaction times; the 
requirement of the experimenter to constantly monitor the TENS device may have subtly 
suggested that it was a complex piece of equipment and, coupled with the scientific 
books and the professionalism put forward by the experimenters‟ smart dress code, may 
have reinforced the suggestion put forward in the instructions. Therefore, it may be 
interesting to test whether the experimenters‟ presence has an effect upon response 
times. In a future study, an experimenter condition and a no experimenter condition could 
be used, with the experimenter only coming back into the room to turn the TENS device 
on when required.  
A second major critique of the study was the use of the computer task to measure 
reaction times, and essentially, the perseveration of the placebo effect. On average, 
participants took approximately 15 minutes to complete the study (without counting the 
initial procedure of gaining their consent, and the debrief following the experiment). 
Although this is not a particularly excessive amount of time, the persistent need to fixate 
on the computer screen for 150 trials, as well as process the between-trial messages 
(and particularly the informed message), may have caused their concentration to wane, 
and fatigue effects on a diminutive level. Consequently, the participants‟ response times 
may have been compromised, and this may perhaps explain why a substantial 
perseveration effect was not found. In order to control for this, perhaps a different means 
of testing the placebo effect could be utilised in a future study. For example, rather than 
measuring reaction times to a computer task, a future study could involve the 
measurement of other physiological responses, such as strength. This could be 
conducted by using a similar procedure to the present study; a dynamometer could be 
used to measure hand grip strength (the physiological response), and placebo 
instructions and the TENS device as the placebos. After several placebo trials of 
measuring hand grip strength, a number of participants could then be informed of the 
placebo via a similar message used in the present study: that the TENS device does not 
have an effect upon a person‟s strength and so any difference would be due to their 
belief that it does. Several subsequent trials could then be carried out, with some 
participants required to do a cognitive load task, to test whether compliance to the 
suggestion is sustained for a period of time after being informed of the false nature of the 
instructions. The difference in participants‟ strength across all of the conditions and within 
the trials could then be determined in order to examine any perseveration effect. This set 
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up may be more effective than the current reaction times study, because participants 
would not be required to continuously focus on a screen and respond, but instead would 
just need to apply a short amount of grip on the dynamometer for each trial. Another 
benefit to this procedure is that placebo effect on strength has not previously been 
tested, and could have significant applications for aspects of health psychology as well 
as sport psychology, by applying Hyland‟s (2011) view of the mind and body as a unified 
system.  
In addition, evidence for the PDP system could be obtained in a future study by 
examining changes in response times at block two, considering this is when participants 
are aware that the TENS device is switched on. Any gradual changes in response times 
after this point could therefore evidence the existence of a PDP system because it would 
support Hyland‟s (2011) theory that cognitive processing of information (being informed 
that the TENS device is switched on) does not result in automatic compliance as 
proposed by Kirsch (1985), which in this case would be an immediate increase or 
decrease in response times.  
A third critique of the study‟s methodology is the quality of the methods used to induce a 
placebo effect, namely the placebo instructions and the TENS device. Other aspects 
were also modified in order to promote a „scientific‟ air to the study; scientific books were 
put on a desk, and the large box that the TENS device was carried in was visible to 
create the notion that a sophisticated piece of equipment was being used. The 
experimenters also wore smart black clothes to further convey a sense of 
professionalism. Although these other aspects combined with the placebo instructions 
and TENS device led to the achievement of the placebo effect, alternative methods could 
be employed in a future study to induce a stronger placebo effect. The written placebo 
instructions, despite containing carefully thought out „scientific‟ rationale, could perhaps 
have been made even more convincing.  For example, a short placebo video could have 
been made and played to all participants at the beginning of the experiment, containing a 
false authority figure, such as a professor or scientist, describing „new research‟ 
regarding the effect of the TENS device upon reaction times. This may be more 
convincing than a single sheet of written instructions, particularly because research in 
persuasion has demonstrated that people have a tendency to believe what is said by 
individuals in a position of authority (Cialdini, 1993). 
In addition, a more sophisticated and imposing physical placebo than a TENS device 
could be used in a future study, such as ERP equipment. This may induce a more 
powerful placebo effect in participants because they may be more convinced that it 
affects reaction times, creating a stronger expectation. Therefore, the deceptive 
measures used to create an expectation in the present study could be improved for a 
future study, in order to induce a more powerful placebo effect than was found.  
The practical implications of a well-developed theory and reliable research findings are 
vast. Although the present study failed to find further evidence of the existence of a PDP 
system, it did not find evidence for Kirsch‟s (1985) immediacy hypothesis either; 
response times did not automatically comply with the new information that the initial 
instructions regarding the TENS device was false, and so this theory could not be 
accepted either. The findings of the present study did, however, demonstrate that 
placebo effects can be induced in participants using an expectation paired with a physical 
placebo, which provides meaningful support for expectancy theory. The study 
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demonstrated that placebo effects can be produced for response times, extending the 
majority of previous research to that outside of placebo medical interventions.  
Nevertheless, health psychologists and health care professionals are likely to benefit 
from a broad range of research within the placebo field, and the placebo instructions and 
the TENS device used in the present study have several implications. Firstly, the specific 
methodology that was employed could be applied to health by potentially inducing a 
placebo effect in something other than response times, such as analgesia. Although 
TENS devices are generally used as a muscle relaxant, the demonstration of the effect of 
placebo instructions regarding a piece of equipment in the present study opens up further 
possibilities for their use. In this sense, the TENS device already has analgesic 
properties, and so pairing this with explicit instructions regarding pain-relief could 
potentially induce a powerful placebo effect. This could be valuable to doctors and 
patients by helping to reduce their pain without resorting to higher doses of medication 
and potential negative side-effects. However, the use of placebo interventions will always 
be debated within the field because of the question of ethics that surrounds their use; 
health care professionals may feel uncomfortable deceiving their patients into believing a 
piece of equipment has a more powerful effect than it actually is likely to have. Instead, 
an alternative approach may be to induce an expectation in patients but without resorting 
to false claims, such as providing them with information of the benefits of using a TENS 
device to relieve pain, and research that demonstrates its effectiveness. According to 
Hyland (2011), this approach could be even more effective if the doctor or therapist is 
sensitive to therapist effects, whereby the bond between the doctor/therapist and their 
patient („therapeutic alliance‟) acts as a placebo in itself. The doctor/therapist therefore 
has the potential to induce a specific expectation regarding the treatment‟s benefit to the 
patient, and higher therapeutic alliance has been found to lead to quicker recovery of the 
patient.  
Therefore, the finding that an expectation paired with a physical placebo can induce a 
placebo effect, as demonstrated in the present study, has important implications for 
health; it provides support for the undervalued role of placebos in health care settings 
and, in particular, the application of expectations, such as patient expectations and how 
these could be shaped by the doctor/therapist to produce a more positive outcome. 
Despite the failure of the present study to obtain evidence of the hysteresis of response 
times and the possible effects of a higher cognitive load, the limitations outlined above 
could perhaps be taken into account allowing for an improved study to be conducted that 
could bring forward robust evidence of the existence of a PDP system.  
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